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STEVEN P. and MELODY JACKSON, 
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Respondents, 
vs. 
REED and DELORES HINCKLEY, 
Defendants and 
Appellants. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs, Steven P. and Melody Jackson commenced an action 
in the Small Claims Division of the Circuit Court of Salt Lake 
County, Murray Department and the matter was heard before Randy 
S. Ludlow, Judge Pro Tern on January 20, 1987. Plaintiffs sought 
the return of their deposit paid to defendants at the commence-
ment of a lease agreement between plaintiffs (lessees) and 
defendants (lessors). 
The court granted plaintiffs a judgment in the sum of 
$355.75 against defendants. Defendants appeal from this judg-
ment. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Plaintiffs and defendants entered into a contract whereby 
plaintiffs leased a home from defendants. (Tr. at 2). At the 
commencement of the lease, plaintiffs paid to defendants the sum 
of $425.00 as a security deposit and $50 as a cleaning deposit. 
* 
* 
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(Tr.at 6), Plaintiffs resided in the home for approximately 2 
1/2 years. (Tr. at 2) . 
Prior to vacating the home in August, 1986, plaintiffs gave 
notice to defendants of their intent to vacate. At the same 
time, plaintiffs inquired both in person and in writing of 
defendants as to any damages defendants thought should be re-
paired prior to plaintiffs vacating defendants1 home. Defendants 
did not inform plaintiffs of any damages defendants thought had 
been done to their home. (Tr. at 9). 
Furthermore, defendant Reed Hinckley worked with plaintiffs 
for three days on the repairs plaintiffs were making prior to 
vacating the home. During that time, plaintiffs asked defendant 
Reed Hinckley if there were any more repairs plaintiffs should 
make. Defendant Reed Hinckley replied "No, the place looks fine. 
You've done enough. I'm going to stay here and I think I'm going 
to try and rent it because it looks so nice. You've done a great 
job." (Tr. at 23). 
Plaintiffs continued to ask defendant Reed Hinckley to let 
plaintiffs know of any other damages needing repairs. Defendant 
Reed Hinckley informed plaintiffs that he would let them know of 
any damages that needed repairs. (Tr. at 24). Plaintiffs were 
never informed of any damages done to the property until Defen-
dants' letter of September 15, 1987. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The judgment rendered in the Small Claims Court should be 
affirmed because it is within the discretion of the Small Claims 
Court to grant defendants' motion for a continuance subject to a 
- 2 -
condition of paying witness fees and mileage. Defendants elected 
to continue with the trial when they refused to pay reasonable 
costs that would have been incurred by the opposing parties as 
the result of the continuance. As such, it is defendants1 fault 
that the trial was not postponed. 
When there is conflicting evidence presented before the 
court, it is the prerogative of the trial court to assess the 
credibility of the evidence and find the facts. The appellate 
court must give appropriate deference to the trial court's 
assessment of the facts of a case. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
IT IS WITHIN THE COURT'S DISCRETION TO IMPOSE 
REASONABLE COSTS, SUCH AS WITNESS FEES AND MILEAGE 
AS A CONDITION OF GRANTING DEFENDANTS A CONTINUANCE. 
Rule 40(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 
Upon motion of a party, the court may in its 
discretion, and upon such terms as may be 
just, including the payment of costs occa-
sioned by such postponement, postpone a trial 
or proceeding upon good cause shown. 
First, it should be noted that the court in this case did 
not deny defendants' motion for a continuance. Rather the court 
granted the continuance subject to a condition of payment of 
witness fees of $14 per witness and mileage at 30 cents per mile. 
(Tr. at 3). This procedure is well established in the courts. 
Peterson v. David, 419 P.2d 138, 139 (Wash. 1966). 
Rule 40(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure clearly 
states that it is within the discretion of the court to impose 
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terms that are just when granting a continuance. These terms may 
include payment of costs that would result from postponement of 
the trial. 
In interpreting Rule 40(b), the Utah Supreme Court has held 
that the decision of a trial court to impose terms as a condition 
to granting a continuance will be overturned by an appellate 
court only if there has been an abuse of discretion and the 
conditions imposed are unreasonable and unjust. Youngren v. John 
W. Lloyd Construction Co., 450 P.2d 985 (Utah 1969). 
Applying the rule to this case, the Small Claims Court judge 
was acting within his authority when he requested that defendants 
pay witness fees plus mileage as a condition of granting defen-
dants1 request for a continuance. The rule clearly grants the 
court such authority. 
Furthermore, the court's decision to demand from defendants 
$14, which is the statutory witness fee, plus 30 cents per mile 
for each of the witnesses, was not unreasonable or unjust. The 
court stated its reasons for imposing the conditions. The 
plaintiffs had come to court on the date set for trial with their 
witnesses ready to proceed with the case. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that where there has been 
ample notice to the parties involved and the plaintiffs and their 
witnesses had traveled a considerable distance and were in court 
ready to proceed, the trial court's decision to grant defendants' 
request for a continuance upon a condition that he pay $200.00 
was not unreasonable or unfair. Youngren, supra. 
-
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Furthermore, the court advised defendants that they should 
have called earlier to request a continuance. Even though the 
court had been closed for three days prior to the morning of the 
trial, the court said that defendants should have called the 
morning of the trial. (Tr. at 3). 
Therefore, it is defendants' own fault that the continuance 
was ultimately denied. Defendants elected to continue with the 
trial instead of accepting the continuance. Under the circum-
stances shown, the court's decision to condition the granting of 
defendants' request for a continuance upon payment of the usual 
witness fees and mileage was neither unreasonable nor unjust. 
POINT II 
WHEN CONFLICTING EVIDENCE IS PRESENTED BEFORE THE COURT, 
IT IS THE DUTY OF THE TRIAL COURT TO ASSESS THE 
CREDIBILITY OF THE EVIDENCE AND ENTER FINDINGS OF FACTS, 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that it is the trial 
court's prerogative to judge the credibility of evidence in 
finding the facts. Prince v. R.C. Tolman Construction Co., Inc., 
610 P.2d 1267 (Utah, 1980). Appellate courts simply are not in a 
position to evaluate and resolve conflicting testimony as accu-
rately as a trial court. Romerell v. Zions First National Bank, 
611 P.2d 392 (Utah, 1980) . 
The Utah Supreme Court has also stated that: 
This court has consistently followed the well 
recognized standard of appellate review which 
precludes the substitution of our judgment for 
that of the trial court on issues of fact, and 
where its findings and judgments are based on 
substantial, competent, admissible evidence we 
will not disturb them. Fisher v. Taylor, 572 
P.2d 393 (Utah, 1977) . 
- 5 -
In the present case, the court was simply exercising its 
prerogative to assess the credibility of conflicting evidence 
presented before it. Defendants presented their evidence and 
asserted that damage was done to their property by plaintiffs. 
Plaintiffs also presented their evidence and contended that there 
were no damages and that prior to vacating the property, defen-
dants inspected the property and stated that "the place looks 
fine." (Tr. at 23). The court considered the conflicting evi-
dence presented by the parties and found it in accordance with 
plaintiffs1 claim. This is in accordance with the trial court's 
duty to find the facts and state its conclusions of law. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants1 contention that they were unjustly denied a 
continuance is without merit. Defendants were not denied a 
continuance. Rather defendants elected to continue with the 
trial because they refused to comply with the reasonable condi-
tions imposed by the court upon the granting of a continuance. 
Both Rule 40(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and prece-
dent state that it is within the trial court1s discretion to 
impose reasonable terms as a condition to granting a continuance. 
Defendants have had their day in court. They have presented 
their evidence before the court, the court has assessed this 
evidence and has found in favor of the plaintiffs. 
Plaintiffs respectfully ask this court to affirm the deci-
sion of the lower court and dismiss defendants1 appeal. 
- 6 -
day of , 1987. 
spectfuLly submitted, 
MASU 
BY: BRUCE PLENI 
Attorney for Respondents 
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